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CULTURAL BIAS IN JUDICIAL  
DECISION MAKING 
MASUA SAGIV* 
Abstract: This Essay describes the phenomenon of cultural bias in judicial deci-
sion making, and examines the use of testimonies and opinions of cultural ex-
perts as a way to diminish this bias. The Essay compares the legal regimes of the 
United States and Israel. Whereas in the United States, the general practice of us-
ing cultural experts in courts is well developed and regulated, the Israeli legal 
procedure has no formal method for admitting cultural expert testimony, and ex-
amples of opinions or testimonies of cultural experts in the Israeli legal system 
are sporadic. The Essay further argues that social science evidence is an essential 
but insufficient means of reducing the cultural bias of judges. Judges’ reliance on 
cultural experts can also be fueled by a preexisting cultural agenda disguised as 
an informed judgment. The Essay concludes with a suggestion of measures that 
can be implemented alongside the use of cultural experts in order to increase 
judges’ awareness of the cultural bias and mitigate its consequences. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The tension between the legal procedure’s goals of neutrality, equality, 
and impartiality, and the fact that judges are human beings that are influenced 
by their life experiences, has been vastly debated in legal and psychological 
literature. This Essay focuses on one among many existing biases in judicial 
decision making: cultural bias. 
 When judges adjudicate cases, they use not only legal knowledge, but 
also knowledge about the world. The source of the judges’ knowledge about 
the world is their “common sense,” which is the intangible cultural system that 
contains people’s informal knowledge about the world from their social 
group’s point of view. Insomuch as the judges’ interpretation about the world is 
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limited to their social group’s interpretation, the proceedings regarding parties 
who do not share the judges’ group’s cultural perspective may be unjust. 
 One way to mitigate the cultural bias of judges is by using social science 
evidence in courts, particularly by way of testimonies and opinions of cultural 
experts (for example, anthropologists or sociologists). In the United States, 
judges frequently rely upon the testimony and opinions of cultural experts and 
the general practice of using cultural experts in courts is well developed and 
regulated, even if reliance upon these experts’ findings is inconsistent among 
different courts. In contrast, Israeli legal procedure has no formal method for 
admitting expert testimony on cultural questions, and examples of opinions or 
testimonies of cultural experts in the Israeli legal system are sporadic, despite 
its diverse and divided cultural nature. 
 The use of cultural experts in courts, however, is an essential but insuffi-
cient means of reducing the cultural bias of judges. Moreover, the belief that 
use of cultural experts adequately diminishes cultural bias is dangerous, as the 
use of such experts can disguise judicial decisions based on a preexisting cul-
tural agenda as informed judgments. Additional safeguards are needed, there-
fore, to ensure that judicial decisions are made independently of cultural biases 
of the judges themselves. 
 Part I of this Essay will introduce cultural bias in culture-related judicial 
decision making and clarify the meaning and role of cultural experts in such 
procedures. Parts II and III will demonstrate the use of cultural experts in 
American courts and their general absence from Israeli legal proceedings, re-
spectively. In view of the American and Israeli arrangements, Part IV will then 
discuss the practice’s vulnerability to preexisting cultural agendas of judges, 
and Part V will suggest measures that can be implemented alongside the use of 
cultural experts in order to increase judges’ awareness of their own cultural 
biases and mitigate its consequences. 
I. CULTURAL BIAS AND CULTURAL EXPERTS 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency whether you choose to call it 
philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and ac-
tion. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All 
their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been 
tugging at them—inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convic-
tions . . . . 
—Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process1F1 
                                                                                                                           
 1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Introduction. The Method of Philosophy, in THE NATURE OF THE JU-
DICIAL PROCESS 9, 12 (1921). 
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 A judge’s subconscious or common sense is inseparable from her deci-
sions. When litigants belong to different cultural groups than a judge, the in-
fluence of her common sense can be especially problematic. Even when the 
judge and the litigant are part of the same cultural group, the application of her 
common sense can lead to biased results. The testimony of cultural experts is a 
common tool used to mitigate these potentially unjust consequences.  
A. Defining “Culture” 
 This Essay uses the term “culture” as it has been defined by Professors 
Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal. Margalit and Halbertal argue that cul-
ture is constitutive of the personality identity of human beings, which is their 
“ability to preserve the attributes that are seen as central by them and the 
members of their group,” or in other words, the categories through which hu-
man beings give meaning to what transpires in their lives.2 This approach is 
consistent with the main school of cultural anthropology. According to Clifford 
Geertz, the founder of cultural anthropology, culture can be thought of as 
“webs of significance” spun by the person herself.3 It “denotes an historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which [people] com-
municate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards 
life.”4 The symbolic conception views culture as the categories, experiences, 
beliefs, and doctrines that organize, rationalize, and justify a distinct way of 
life. 
 Similarly, the dominant paradigm of social studies “conceptualizes cul-
ture as interwoven with all social practices . . . .”5 Culture is defined as the 
meanings and values that arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, 
on the basis of their historical conditions and relationships, through which they 
handle and respond to the conditions of existence. It is also defined as the lived 
traditions and practices through which those “understandings” are expressed 
and in which they are embodied. 
 In almost every society, people, in their day-to-day experiences and 
through meeting different people, interact with several cultures. Thus, identity 
is determined by multiple cultures and has varied contents—every person is in 
a sense multicultural. For example, an African-American lesbian woman be-
longs to at least three cultural groups, each with its own unique cultural con-
tent and distinct manifestations in the woman’s life.  
                                                                                                                           
 2 Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 61 SOC. RES. 491, 
502 (1994). 
 3 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE IN-
TERPRETATION OF CULTURE: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 5 (2000 ed.). 
 4 GEERTZ, supra note 3, at 87, 89. 
 5 Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, 2 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 57, 63 (1980). 
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B. Cultural Bias in the Courtroom 
 In his seminal essay, The Nature of the Judicial Process, from nearly a 
century ago, Benjamin Cardozo analyzed the ingredients of “that strange com-
pound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts . . . .”6 Among these 
ingredients, he distinguished between the judge’s conscious and subconscious 
decision making. Whereas the conscious element comprises “guiding princi-
ples of conduct,” the subconscious element is much more elusive, encompass-
ing the judge’s inherited instincts, traditional beliefs and acquired convictions.7 
Like the conscious component, the judge’s subconscious is inseparable from 
her decisions. Cardozo writes that, while “[w]e [as judges] may try to see 
things as objectively as we please . . . we can never see them with any eyes 
except our own.”8 Furthermore, “[i]t is often through these subconscious forc-
es that judges are kept consistent with themselves, and inconsistent with one 
another.”9 
 What Cardozo calls the subconscious, Menachem Mautner calls “com-
mon sense.”10F10 Mautner explains that the application of the categories of sub-
stantive law is not made solely based on “legal” categories, but also on an ex-
tensive use of the judges’ broader knowledge about the world. In the context of 
decisional reasoning by jurists, these two bodies of information—legal catego-
ries and knowledge about the world—are inseparable. The source of the jurist’s 
knowledge about the world (as used to apply substantive law) is “common 
sense,” that is, the intangible cultural system that contains empirical and nor-
mative information about the world, with which people can function normally 
in their everyday lives within their social groups. Common sense is the cultural 
component encompassing people’s informal knowledge regarding the ways in 
which the social and natural worlds work, and how to conduct relationships 
                                                                                                                           
 6 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 10. 
 7 Id. at 11–12.   
 8 Id. at 13.  
 9 Id. at 12. See generally Robert J. MacCoun, Balancing Evidence and Norms in Cultural Evolu-
tion, (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2516441, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2516441 (providing an analysis of this point from a different perspec-
tive). It is important to state that this Essay will not deal with the jurisprudential questions regarding 
the relationship between law and culture (that is, whether culture is a part of law, or whether it is dis-
tinct and independent, to the point that law acts as an entry barrier for the judge’s own culture). For 
the purposes of this Essay, suffice it to say that judges’ cultural backgrounds significantly influence 
their judicial decisions. See generally Naomy Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 
(2001) (providing further elaboration on this issue). 
 10 Menachem Mautner, Common Sense, Legitimacy, Coercion: Judges as Narrators, 7 PLILIM 
(ISRAEL J. OF CRIM. JUSTICE) 11, 14 (1998); see also MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CUL-
TURE OF ISRAEL 72 n.89, 80 (2011) (providing a short English summary of his theory on judges’ 
“common sense”). Menachem Mautner is the Daniel Rubinstein Chair Professor of Comparative Civil 
Law and Jurisprudence at the Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law. 
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with people. In short, common sense is people’s informal knowledge about the 
world from their social group’s point of view. 
 Consider, as an example of shared common sense, a May 2013 case in 
which the Israeli Supreme Court heard an appeal of a Palestinian child who 
was injured by soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).11F11 The child, Ahmad 
Abu Fadah, argued that he was shot unjustifiably while walking to the grocery 
store, whereas the IDF argued that there was a disturbance of the peace in the 
area, which resulted in one soldier’s uniform catching fire from a Molotov 
cocktail. In the trial court, the soldier described his reaction to the fire by 
demonstrating his movement, and comparing it to Keanu Reeves’ movement in 
the movie The Matrix. The appellant argued that the soldier’s reference to a 
violent movie during serious legal proceedings undermined the credibility of 
his testimony.  
 In his ruling, Justice Amit referred to the appellant’s argument, stating: “I 
will leave the reader to judge whether demonstrating the movement by com-
paring it to the movie The Matrix injures the witness’ credibility. The appel-
lant’s attorney did not clarify whether he refers to The Matrix 1, 2 or 3, but I 
am willing to assume that he means all three movies in which the characters, 
bad or good, and not just ‘the one,’ avoid bullets as fast as lightning and assault 
each other.”12F12 Justice Amit saw no problem with the soldier’s testimony, assert-
ing that the soldier only intended to spontaneously demonstrate a quick move-
ment and that he probably did it much slower than it was done in the Matrix 
movies. The cultural reference here to the movie The Matrix is obvious and 
understood in more or less the same way by the parties and judge as members 
of a liberal democracy where American movies are accessible. 
 Judges’ application of common sense can be especially problematic when 
a case involves individuals who belong to a different cultural group than the 
judge.13F13 The judge applies her cultural group’s common sense, whereas the 
person or group before the court applies a different common sense. When ei-
ther the information subject to interpretation by each group’s common sense, 
or the interpretation itself, is different, the judge’s use of common sense may 
result in cultural coercion.  Consider a different, hypothetical case, in which the 
cultural reference presents a conundrum to the court because the liberal judge’s 
knowledge about the world does not extend to the metaphor used by the wit-
ness or litigant. In the best case scenario, the judge will acknowledge her lack 
of understanding, and might ignore the cultural reference, or ask the member 
of the cultural group to clarify its meaning. In the worst case scenario, the 
                                                                                                                           
 11 CA 5179/11 Abu Fadah (minor) v. State of Israel (May 2, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 12 Id. ¶ 4. 
 13 Mautner, supra note 10, at 58–69. 
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judge will be unaware of any different cultural interpretations, and will incor-
rectly apply her common sense. 
 The Canadian case Delgamuukw v. The Queen is a real world example of 
the latter.14F14 When the case was first brought to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, the court was required to decide upon land claims of the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en aboriginal tribes.15F15 No less than forty-eight tribal chiefs as 
well as anthropological experts testified in favor of the tribes’ claims, yet Chief 
Justice Allan McEachern doubted the sincerity of the anthropological experts’ 
testimony because, according to him, it was not objective.16F16 Anthropologist 
Robert Paine, for example, in his commentary after the trial, illustrated the 
many gaps of cultural understanding and interpretation that existed between 
the Chief Justice and the tribal chiefs.17F17 For example, he explained that, while 
the tribal chiefs understood the phrase “literally true” to refer to an “ipso facto 
truth,” the Chief Justice interpreted it to mean “factually true in a proven sense 
(in written documents preferably).”18F18 Both sides, however, were unaware of 
the gaps of cultural interpretation between them, and this ultimately influenced 
the result of the trial and the tribes’ perception of the legal process. 19 F19 
 It should be noted that the other side of the coin is also troubling. When 
judges apply their common sense in cases involving individuals who belong to 
their own cultural group, the application of this group’s common sense might 
lead to partiality of the judge. For example, in the Canadian case R.D.S. v. The 
Queen, a white officer arrested a black fifteen year-old who had allegedly in-
terfered with the arrest of another youth.20F20 While delivering her oral reasons 
for acquitting the accused, the Youth Court Judge—a black woman—stated 
“that police officers had been known to mislead the court in the past, that they 
had been known to overreact particularly with non-white groups, and that that 
would indicate a questionable state of mind.”21F21 The judge noted that “her 
comments were not [specific] to the police officer testifying before the 
court.”22F22 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the judge’s words raised “a 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).  
 15 Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Delgamuukw I), [1991] 79 D.L.R.4th 185 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).  
 16 Antonia Mills, Problems of Establishing Authority in Testifying on Behalf of the Witsuwit’en, 
19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 39, 39–41 (1996). 
 17 Robert Paine, In Chief Justice McEachern’s Shoes: Anthropology’s Ineffectiveness in Court, 
19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 59, 61 (1996). 
 18 See id. (“There are different denotations of ‘literal’ here; for the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, 
their myths are ‘literally true’ in the sense that they carry an ‘ipso facto truth’ . . . but for McEachern, 
‘literally true’ means factually true in a proven sense (in written documents preferably).”). 
 19 Id. at 59, 61. It should be noted that Chief Justice McEachern’s judgment was highly criticized, 
and his judgment was partly reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Delgamuukw II, [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 1010.  
 20 R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (Can.). 
 21 Id. at 484–85. 
 22 Id. at 485. 
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reasonable apprehension of bias.”23 The Supreme Court held that, although 
“neutrality does not require judges to discount their life experiences[,]” it does 
prohibit them from basing (or appearing to base) their judgments “on generali-
zations or stereotypes” rather than on the particular evidence and witnesses 
that are in front of them.24 
C. Mitigating the Effects of Cultural Bias: The Role of  
Anthropologists and Sociologists 
 One of the most prominent ways to mitigate the potentially unjust conse-
quences of this gap in cultural understanding is through the testimony of cul-
tural experts, mainly anthropologists and sociologists.25 These cultural experts 
can temper the effect of bias by serving as translators and pushing back against 
the empirical assumptions that advocates and jurists make in the course of pre-
senting and hearing evidence.26 
 The inclination of lawyers and courts is to perceive facts and evidence as 
empirical, precise, and positivistic.27F27 As a basic conception in law, this inclina-
tion has a practical logic, since legal proceedings are not an academic exer-
cise—the purpose is to reach a decision settling a dispute, leaving no room for 
existential doubts. However, when the conflict involves cultural differences, 
this approach is problematic, since culture-dependent facts can be highly con-
textual and may be subject to competing interpretations by those involved in 
the case. In such cases, the standard tools available to the jurists are inade-
quate, and the expertise of cultural experts—anthropologists or sociologists—
is needed. 28 F28 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. at 487. 
 25 For an elaboration of the possible use of social science evidence in litigation and how it can be 
presented in courts, see generally Benjamin Perryman, Social Science in Economic and Social Rights 
Litigation (Apr. 10, 2013) (unpublished L.L.M. term paper, Yale Law School) (on file with author). 
 26 See Paine, supra note 17, at 61; Perryman, supra note 25, at 12–19. 
 27 LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 119–20 (2006). 
 28 Id. For further discussion regarding the differences of perception between jurists and anthro-
pologists, see generally NORBERT ROULAND, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Philippe Planel trans., 1994); 
Michael Freeman & David Napier, Introduction to Law and Anthropology, in 12 CURRENT LEGAL 
ISSUES 1 (Michael Freeman & David Napier eds., 2009); Randy Frances Kandel, Double Vision: An-
thropologists at Law, 11 NAPA BULLETIN 1, 1 (1992). Some writers advocate for the separation of 
academia from the legal process. According to this approach, there is no place for academic infor-
mation and theories in the legal process. This approach conceives of the legal process as having a 
unique decisional character, similar to the practical wisdom model of moral and public decision mak-
ing. Social science information, according to Mautner for example, should enter the legal process via 
the judge’s common sense, after it is assimilated into the social common sense the judge uses. Maut-
ner, supra note 10, at 52–54. I disagree with this approach. If academia is full of debates and theories 
and controversies, how can we rely upon the academic information that finds its way (usually through 
the media) into our society’s common sense? Surely we cannot attach the latter with higher credibility 
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 The anthropologist or sociologist has two functions in her capacity as a 
cultural expert.29 The first is providing the court with the relevant cultural in-
formation. The second, and crucial function, is translating this information, and 
bridging the gaps of understanding between the judge or fact finder and the 
litigants or witnesses. This function is reflected in the words of anthropologist 
Mils Hills: 
There is an inherent value in what we find and in how we interpret 
and communicate those findings, adding rich, contextual insight 
where understanding is not of words or even of sentences and single 
statements, but is the communication of another way of understand-
ing things about the world . . . .30 
 In a lecture on the Israeli ultra-Orthodox group, Rabbi Dabid Bloch, an 
ultra-Orthodox rabbi, said: 
Amnon Levi published a book about the “Haredim” [the ultra-
orthodox public] . . . . The facts [in the book] are 95% correct, very 
accurate. Yet, whoever reads it still doesn’t understand the Haredim. 
Why? I remember when I was a child, rich people could afford to 
video shoot weddings in 8 mm. You don’t hear the sound there . . . . 
When you watch the movie, and you reach the dancing, it’s just fun-
ny. Because you don’t hear the music; you don’t get into the atmos-
phere; you see people jumping up and down with their mouths open 
doing weird movements. Since you don’t get into the vibe, it seems 
to you like a funny group of people doing nonsense; because you’re 
not in the music; you don’t hear the music. So even when you read 
the book and know all the facts, since you don’t hear the music—it’s 
not true.31 
 Cultural experts, when used in the course of a trial, can serve to mitigate 
the effects of these biases that the judge’s personal culture, or common sense, 
may introduce into the deliberations.  
                                                                                                                           
than information that is adopted directly from academia, without the filter of the media and public 
opinion, and with a fair opportunity to question the scholar’s statements in court. 
 29 ROSEN, supra note 27, at 119–20; Mils Hills, Anthropology at the Centre: Reflections on Re-
search, Policy Guidance and Decision Support, in APPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY: PROFESSION-
AL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 130, 133 (Sarah Pink ed., 2006).  
 30 Hills, supra note 29, at 133 (internal quotations omitted). 
 31 David Bloch, Rabbi, Lecture at Match Point: The Worldview of the Ultra-Orthodox Public, 
Part I (Nov. 11, 2012) (transcription and translation by the author, original Hebrew available at http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZbGsOF3CDE). 
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II. THE GENERAL USE OF CULTURAL EXPERTS IN AMERICAN COURTS 
Since 1908, cultural information has been used in American courts in a 
variety of situations. The admission and use of these expert cultural opinions is 
governed by Rules 702 through 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
criteria the U.S. Supreme Court established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. in 1993.32 While the testimony of these experts is often ad-
mitted and relied upon by courts, judges do not always accept the testimony of 
cultural experts. Often, the rejection of a cultural expert’s testimony is made 
without detailed reasoning for the rejection of the testimony. Use of such ex-
perts is therefore not a perfect solution, but the possibility of introducing an-
thropological or sociological evidence provides one tool for mitigating the ef-
fects of cultural bias. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of all evidence 
put forward in American federal trials.33 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which 
governs testimony given by an expert witness states as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if: 
 (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; 
 (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and meth-
ods; and 
 (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case.34 
Under Rule 702, the test for determining whether the court should admit 
testimony from an expert witness is based on the measure of that testimony’s 
assistance to the trier of fact, which is a “common sense inquiry [into] whether 
the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the 
best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those hav-
ing a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.”35 An 
opinion is excluded if it is unhelpful and therefore superfluous. “[T]he trial 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). Rule 702 governs testimo-
ny given by an expert witness; Rule 703 covers the bases of an expert’s opinion testimony; Rule 704 
provides guidance as to whether expert witnesses can testify as to the ultimate issue of a case; Rule 
705 involves the disclosure of the facts or data underlying an expert’s opinion; and Rule 706 deals 
with court-appointed expert witnesses. FED. R. EVID. 702–706.  
 33 FED. R. EVID. 702–706.  
 34 Id. R. 702. 
 35 Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952). 
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judge [has] considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go 
about determining whether [a] particular expert testimony is reliable.”36  
The criteria of expert testimony established by Rule 702 were set forth in 
Daubert in 1993,37 which overturned the “general acceptance” rule established 
by Frye v. U.S. in 1923.38 Daubert set forth a non-exhaustive checklist for trial 
courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The spe-
cific factors explicated by the Daubert Court were: “whether a theory or tech-
nique . . . can be (and has been) tested . . . whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication . . . [its] known or potential rate 
of error . . .” and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its 
operation, and whether it has attracted “widespread acceptance” within a rele-
vant scientific community.39 Deciding whether an expert’s testimony should be 
admitted is a “flexible” inquiry, according to the Daubert Court, and the focus 
of the inquiry “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the con-
clusions that they generate.”40 According to the advisory committee’s note on 
the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, the case law after Daubert indicates that in 
most cases expert testimony is accepted by courts.41 In 1999, the Supreme 
Court held in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael that these factors may also be ap-
plicable to nonscientific expert testimony.42  
The pioneer use of cultural information in an American court was in 
1908, in a brief that Louis Brandeis submitted to the Supreme Court for Muller 
v. Oregon.43 The brief, later known as the Brandeis Brief, was submitted to the 
Court in support of a state law restricting the number of hours women were 
allowed to work. The brief was over one hundred pages, but only two of them 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Kumho Tire Co. v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); see 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW § 1918 (3d ed. 1940). 
 37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–96. 
 38 Id. at 586; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, 
FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. According to the general acceptance 
rule, the information presented by the expert should be accepted by a substantial part of her scientific 
community. Frye, 293 F.3d at 1014. Some states still use the Frye test, including California, Florida, 
Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington. For 
elaboration, see Martin S. Kaufman, Atlantic Legal Found., The Status of Daubert in State Courts 15, 
24, 26, 27–28, 30–31, 33, 34 (2006); Stephen J. Odgers & James T. Richardson, Keeping Bad Science 
Out of the Courtroom—Changes in American and Australian Expert Evidence Law, 18 U.N.S.W.L.J. 
108 (1995). 
 39 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–95. 
 40 See id. at 595. The courts and the literature have also dealt with the evaluation of expert testi-
mony by jurors. See, e.g., Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert 
Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 441 (2003). 
 41 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 42 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 43 See Brief for Defendant in Error at 18, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107); see 
also Muller, 208 U.S. at 416. 
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were dedicated to legal argument—the rest consisted entirely of testimony by 
medics, social scientists and male workers.44 
Forty years later, Dr. Robert Redfield’s expert testimony was used by pe-
titioners in the American desegregation cases of the 1950s. 45 F45In Sweatt v. 
Painter, Redfield, a Professor of Anthropology, testified regarding both the 
influence of segregation in education on the segregated population, and the 
consequences of court-ordered integration.   46 F46His testimony and other testimo-
nies were widely cited in the arguments of those opposing segregation, includ-
ing in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas.47F47 As Professor Rosen 
stated: “[t]he Court [in Brown] then formally repudiated the implicit psycholo-
gy of the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine and supplied a footnote reference to the 
writings of Clark, Chein, Myrdal, and other social scientists to support their 
assertion that the harm of segregation ‘is amply supported by modern authori-
ty.’”48F48 In the Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia, which struck down anti-
miscegenation laws as unconstitutional, many of the briefs submitted to the 
Court contained significant citations to anthropological works.49F49 Similarly, the 
Court’s ruling in favor of Amish parents who refused to send their children to 
high school in Yoder v. Wisconsin was highly influenced by the testimony at 
trial of an anthropologist, Dr. John Hostetler. 50F50 More recently, social science 
evidence played a central role in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, where the Court held that local public school 
boards’ policies that used racial classifications in student school assignments in 
order to obtain racial diversity in public schools were unconstitutional.51F51 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 118, 120 
(Nelson L. Dawson, ed., 1989). For a discussion regarding the merits of briefs as opposed or in addi-
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 45 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 561–
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 47 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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Naturally, cultural experts are commonly found in cases involving indi-
viduals whose culture plays a prominent role in the facts of the case. The most 
prevalent examples are custody, discrimination based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation and nationality and criminal cases involving cultural issues or prac-
tices.52 
In custody cases, testimony of cultural experts is used to determine the 
best interest of the child or to refute claims of harm to a child that may be 
grounded in cultural bias. For example, in custody cases involving homosexual 
parents, social science evidence is often presented either to establish the claim 
that homosexual parenting has negative effects on the child, or to counteract 
the myths and assumptions about homosexual parenting.53 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the case that struck down California’s Proposi-
tion 8, which outlawed gay marriage, is a good example of the use of cultural 
experts for both discrimination and parenting arguments. 54 The plaintiffs in the 
case presented the testimony of nine expert witnesses including Letitia Anne 
Peplau, a psychologist, who testified about the remarkable similarities between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples; Ilan Meyer, a social epidemiologist, who 
testified about the stigma and social stresses experienced by gays and lesbians; 
Gregory Herek, a social psychologist, who testified about the nature of sexual 
orientation and the nature of stigma and prejudice as they relate to sexual ori-
entation and Proposition 8; and Michael Lamb, a psychologist specializing in 
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Id. at 452. 
 54 See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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developmental psychology of children, including those raised by gay and les-
bian parents, who offered the opinion that children raised by gay and lesbian 
parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual 
parents, and would benefit if their parents were able to marry.55 
As is the case with other experts, judges do not always accept the testi-
mony of cultural experts. For example, in Perry, after a thorough analysis, 
Judge Walker rejected the testimony of David Blankenhorn, founder and presi-
dent of the Institute for American Values, deeming it “inadmissible opinion 
testimony that should be given essentially no weight.”56 Walker found that 
Blankenhorn lacked the education relevant to the fields of marriage, father-
hood, and family structure, on which he testified as an expert. The books 
Blankenhorn authored and edited were not subject to peer review and, accord-
ing to the judge, his opinions were thus unreliable as expert testimony. For 
example, Blankenhorn relied on others’ definitions of marriage, yet provided 
no explanation as to the meaning of these definitions or their sources. Judge 
Walker held that the analytical gap between the data provided by Blankenhorn 
and his opinion was too great and that his investigation was not conducted at 
the same level of intellectual rigor characterizing the practice of anthropolo-
gists, sociologists or psychologists. 
Not all judges, however, produce such detailed and convincing reasoning 
for the rejection of expert testimony, as exemplified by the case of Anna Mae 
He.57 The case involved a custody battle between the white American foster 
parents (the Bakers) and Chinese birth parents (the Hes) of Anna Mae He. 
Shaio-Quiang (Jack) He and his wife, Qin (Casey) Lou (He) were living in the 
United States on graduate-student and student-spouse visas. In 1998, after a 
graduate student accused Mr. He of assaulting her, the Hes’ visas were invali-
dated. Mrs. He was pregnant at the time and gave birth to Anna Mae on Janu-
ary 28, 1999 in the United States. 
Due to financial difficulties, the Hes determined they could not care for 
the newborn and approached Mid-South Christian Services, who agreed to 
place Anna Mae in foster care for ninety days. Jerry and Louise Baker, experi-
enced foster parents with several children of their own, became Anna Mae’s 
foster family. During the following three months, the Hes visited Anna Mae 
weekly pursuant to a verbal agreement, and at the end of that period, requested 
that Anna Mae be returned. Because of their continuing financial difficulties, 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 32–34. 
 56 Id. at 946. 
 57 See In re Adoption of A.M.H., No. CH-01-1302-III, 2005 WL 3132353, at *29 (Tenn. App. 
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however, the Hes intended to send Anna Mae to China to live with relatives. In 
light of this information, the Bakers offered to keep the baby beyond the nine-
ty-day agreement.  
In June 1999, the court transferred temporary legal custody of Anna Mae 
to the Bakers.58 The Hes continued to visit Anna Mae, but on Anna Mae’s sec-
ond birthday, a dispute between the parties prompted the Hes to file papers for 
Anna Mae’s return, stating their desire to return to China as a family. Prior to 
the hearing to terminate the temporary custody arrangement, the Bakers filed 
an application to terminate the Hes’ parental rights on the grounds that four 
months had passed since the Hes’ last visitation.59 The initial proceedings 
stopped while the termination matter was tried.  
At trial, the Bakers insisted that the Hes asked them to care for Anna Mae 
until she reached eighteen as long as they had visitation rights, whereas the 
Hes insisted that the agreement was meant to continue the current arrangement 
and merely transfer legal custody to the Bakers so that Anna Mae could receive 
coverage under the Bakers’ health insurance. Moreover, the Hes argued that 
according to the arrangement, they could change their minds at any time. After 
a nine -day trial, the chancery court judge, Judge Robert Childers, terminated 
the Hes’ parental rights, citing abandonment pursuant to a willful failure to 
visit and a willful failure to provide support for the statutory period of four 
months.60 The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the He’s 
parental rights in 2005.61 Two years later, however, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s decision, and ordered that Anna Mae be re-
turned to her biological parents.62 The case garnered international attention, 
and generated significant controversy for two reasons: (1) the delay in achiev-
ing a final judgment on the matter, and (2) allegations of cultural and racial 
bias in the decisions, especially the chancery court’s 2004 judgment. 
Judge Childers stated that he found the testimony given by Dr. John 
Cooper, the Chinese cultural expert who testified on behalf of the Hes, to be 
“totally lacking in credibility” and “untrustworthy.”63 Judge Childers also 
found that “Dr. Cooper is not an expert in Chinese adoption law, nor is he an 
expert on termination of parental rights.”64 
At the same time, Judge Childers reached his own conclusions regarding 
Chinese culture and its ramifications for Anna Mae: 
                                                                                                                           
 58 In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 798–799 (Tenn. 2007). 
 59 Id. at 801–802. 
 60 In re Adoption of A.M.H., 2005 WL 3132353, at *23, *31. 
 61 Id. at *1. 
 62 In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 811, 813.  
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There is a “one-child-per-family” policy in the People’s Republic of 
China. Families with more than one child are subject to financial 
penalties or the loss of government services and benefits, including 
medical care and educational benefits . . . . Mr. He fears returning 
Anna Mae to the People’s Republic of China because the death rate 
for children of Anna Mae’s gender is fifty (50%) percent in that 
country.65 
The judgment was predominantly grounded upon Anna Mae’s relation-
ship with the Bakers and the Hes’ questionable character in the eyes of the 
court, rather than upon Anna Mae’s interest in staying in the United States and 
not returning to China.  Nevertheless, Judge Childers’ refused to rely on the 
cultural expert, instead basing his impressions about Chinese families solely on 
American perceptions about China.66 
The Hes appealed the decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The 
Greater Seattle Chapter of the Organization of Chinese Americans submitted 
an amici curiae brief in which they argued that the trial court failed to consider 
social science evidence concerning Asian culture and practices, the importance 
of ethnic heritage and a child’s special needs as a racial minority, and cultural 
and ethnic factors relevant to a successful multi-ethnic child-parent situation.67 
While it does not seem that the court gave much weight to these arguments, the 
court did acknowledge the testimony of the Hes’ expert, who addressed the 
issue of the one-child rule in China: 
On direct examination, Dr. Cooper testified that the Chinese gov-
ernment does not impose fines on parents who have more than one 
child outside of China then return to that country. However, under 
cross-examination, Dr. Cooper conceded that the Chinese govern-
ment could impose such fines.68 
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Continuing its discussion of the one-child policy, the Court of Appeals 
cited a letter addressed to the court by the Chinese Embassy, defending China’s 
one-child policy by referencing circumstances in which people can have more 
than one or two children, including instances when Chinese citizens return to 
China from abroad with more than one child. Further, the letter sought to in-
form the court that the Chinese government does not impose financial penalties 
or remove governmental services and benefits for violations of this policy. The 
court found that the letter lacked sufficient detail to convince it that the Hes 
would not be penalized should they return to China with Anna Mae. Conclud-
ing this affair, the Tennessee Supreme Court minimized the influence of the 
Hes’ culture and national origin, stating: “we note that the testimony concern-
ing the general conditions in China is not relevant to a finding of substantial 
harm.”69 
III. THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF CULTURAL EXPERTS  
FROM ISRAELI COURTS 
In contrast to the United States, cultural experts are extremely rare in Is-
raeli courts. Although there is no legal prohibition on cultural experts testifying 
in Israeli courts, the existence of such experts is generally not acknowledged in 
the academic and legal discourse. While Israel’s Evidence Ordinance defines 
“experts” broadly, the tendency is to classify matters involving culture not as 
matters of expertise, but as matters of knowledge common to—as the retired 
Judge Amnon Carmi stated—“every intelligent person.”70 These matters may 
also be found in “the practical experience that is acquired by every person in 
everyday life.”71 Under common knowledge theory of understanding “culture,” 
there is obviously no need for the expert’s special knowledge, and the judge is 
perfectly capable of acquiring and understanding the relevant information by 
herself. As will be elaborated below, cultural experts are so rare in Israeli 
courts that these experts are absent from cases even where the need for an ex-
pert is obvious.  
An expert, according to the Evidence Ordinance, testifies or gives her 
opinion in matters of science, research, art or professional knowledge.72 This 
definition is broad and inclusive, with hardly any restrictions, as opposed to 
the restrictions and requirements placed specifically upon medical experts, 
psychologists, legal experts, engineers or architects, and real estate apprais-
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ers.73 In fact, the only general limitation on being recognized as an expert is 
that the qualifications to give an opinion on a specific issue are acquired by 
means of special expertise, through academic studies or practical experience.74 
Despite the broad definition of “expert” and the distinct multicultural 
character of Israel, there are only sporadic examples of the use of cultural ex-
perts in the Israeli legal system. Furthermore, in the expert database through 
which the Israeli Bar refers lawyers and parties for the purpose of consultation 
and expert opinions, there are no cultural experts. 75 F75 Consultation with such 
experts in legal proceedings is rare, and usually done at the initiative of the 
parties. Inquiries with Israeli academic cultural experts uncovered only a few 
instances where expert cultural testimony was utilized in legal proceedings. 
In a few instances, cultural experts have served the High Court of Justice 
with their opinions. From 2006 to 2012, social anthropologist Shuli Hartman 
served three anthropological opinions to the High Court of Justice through the 
“Bimkom—Planners for Planning Rights” organization.76F76 The first, from 2006, 
involved the residential area of the Dallin tribe, following their appeal to ap-
prove a basic master plan; 77 F77 the second, from November 2011, involved the 
planning of the Bedouin village of Dakika (as a part of procedures to recognize 
the village); 78 F78 and the third, from July 2012, involved the residential area of 
Khirbet Znota, in light of the authorities’ refusal to regulate the planning of the 
village. 79 F79 The anthropologist Prof. Gideon Kressel wrote a letter of opinion in 
2006, also to the High Court of Justice, regarding the unique desert culture of 
the residents of the South Hebron Mountains, at the request of an organization 
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called “Rabbis for Human Rights,” in HCJ 3043/07 Jabbarin.80 The petition 
involved the route of the separation wall, and Prof. Kressel’s opinion was used 
to illustrate the damages that will be caused to the residents of the South Heb-
ron Mountains by the planned route.  
In other instances, the opinions of cultural experts were solicited by the 
lower courts. Anthropologist Dr. Malka Shabtai was occasionally asked to tes-
tify in military trials of Ethiopian soldiers, or to give counsel to lawyers han-
dling cases involving members of the Ethiopian community.81 Anthropologist 
and psychologist Yoram Bilu was asked years ago to write an anthropological 
opinion in an attempt to trace a possibility for a cultural motive in a case of a 
child that murdered his parents and brothers in the area of Jerusalem.82 
The practice of consulting cultural experts is so rare in the Israeli legal 
system that such experts are even absent from cases where the need for them is 
obvious. Such was the case of Jane Doe, involving an Ethiopian toddler who 
was born in 2011 to a mother suffering from severe mental illness.83 It was 
unknown who the father of the child is, and at first, it was unclear whether the 
child’s aunts were capable or willing to take him into their custody. After sev-
eral legal and social care procedures, the child was transferred to a white foster 
family (with the biological family entitled to visitation), as a part of a fosterage 
for the intent of adoption procedure. The child’s aunt challenged the decision 
transferring the child to the foster family and requested to adopt him herself. 
The case went through extensive legal proceedings, including two appearances 
before the Supreme Court. The final decision, issued in December 2013 by the 
Supreme Court following a Civil Further Hearing, held that due to the amount 
of time passed and in the interest of the child, the child was to stay with the 
foster family, which would soon become his adoptive family. Nearing the end 
of her long judgment, Deputy Chief Justice Miriam Naor stated, almost inci-
dentally, that no sufficient foundation was laid in front of the court regarding 
the specific difficulties facing adopted children whose skin color differs from 
their parents.84 In addition, no data was brought in front of the court concern-
ing the separation of the child from the Ethiopian congregation, but Naor did 
not seem to think the absence of these facts and data was important, covering 
for it with baseless assumptions.85 
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The Supreme Court of Israel took a similar approach of vaguely assessing 
cultural arguments in a case involving ethnic segregation in the ultra-orthodox 
city of Immanuel, infamously known in Israel for the Immanuel “Beis-
Yaakov” affair.86 Beginning in 2007, the Beis-Yaakov ultra-orthodox school 
for girls in the city of Immanuel enforced ethnic segregation between girls of 
Ashkenazi descent and girls of Sephardic descent. In 2009, the school policies 
came before the High Court of Justice, which declared the practice of segrega-
tion illegal, and demanded its elimination.87 
The ultra-orthodox respondents argued that the practice of separation—
which they differentiated from segregation—is founded on religious beliefs. 
According to this argument, there were two explanations for the relatively ho-
mogeneous ethnic makeup of ultra-orthodox schools. The first was the exist-
ence of various ethnically homogeneous streams in the ultra-orthodox public, 
which differ from one another in their level of religiousness, and seek to main-
tain their unique way of life within their communities.88 The second explana-
tion, which followed the first, was that the sorting procedure was based on the 
spiritual level of the students and their families, and many Sephardic families 
are less religious since their ancestors were not raised and educated in a deeply 
rooted ultra-orthodox family.89  
The court gave no serious consideration to respondents’ cultural claim, 
and held that the basis for the segregation was ethnicity. The judges did not 
consider the sincerity of the argument nor its sources, basis, or the ramifica-
tions of disregarding it for the ultra-orthodox group and its members’ way of 
life. 
The results of this lack of consideration were soon revealed. The parents 
whose daughters attended the Ashkenazi Track refused to follow the judgment, 
and after nine months, the court issued arrest orders for them.90 The ultra-
orthodox public considered both the judgment and the arrest orders as chal-
lenging their beliefs and way of life, and a public campaign was organized in 
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response, including, among other things, massive demonstrations in Jerusalem 
and Bnei-Brak, and a police escort of the fathers of the Ashkenazi girls to 
jail.91 Following further efforts by the Court and other agents, an agreement 
was reached, according to which the girls of the former Ashkenazi Track went 
back to the integrated school for the last three days of the school year. The fol-
lowing year a new school was established, under the approval of the Ministry 
of Education. The school was designated for the girls of the Ashkenazi Track 
and was not funded by the state in its first year. 
The case studies of Israel and the United States illuminate the complexity 
of the problem. In Israel, there is insufficient awareness of the influence of 
judges’ cultural biases on their decisions, and the practice of using cultural ex-
perts is generally absent from the legal system. As discussed, Israeli judges are 
not bothered by this lack of cultural information, and deem themselves capable 
of independently reaching a well-informed decision in culture-related cases—
usually based upon judgments and assumptions that stem from the judges’ 
common sense. This approach harms the court’s credibility in the eyes of dif-
ferent cultural groups living within the state, and produces inequitable judicial 
decisions grounded in incorrect or inaccurate information. As the American 
case study demonstrates, it seems that the practice of relying on cultural ex-
perts in the United States has provided a way for judges to mitigate cultural 
bias. American judges are prima facie conscious of potential cultural gaps in 
culture-related cases and usually welcome cultural experts to their courts. It is 
therefore necessary for Israel to undertake an effort to establish better practic-
es, in part based on the United States’ system of expert testimony. Such prac-
tices would be the first step toward alleviating the negative consequences of 
judicial cultural bias. 
IV. CULTURAL EXPERTS AND CULTURAL BIAS IN COURTS 
The differing legal regimes of the United States and Israel surrounding 
cultural experts suggest a strategy for dealing with courts’ cultural biases. The 
challenges to the reliance on testimony of cultural experts are best addressed 
through the development of guidelines regarding the testimony of cultural ex-
perts. Even with the adoption of such standards, however, the problems and 
concerns associated with judges’ inherent cultural biases remain. 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Yair Ettinger, Jerusalem Police Gird for 20,000-Strong Ultra-Orthodox Protest, HAARETZ (June 
17, 2010, 1:44 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/jerusalem-police-gird-for-20-000-
strong-ultra-orthodox-protest-1.296638. The mothers did not go to jail. Tomer Zarchin & Yair Ettinger, 
Court Exempts Immanuel Mothers from Jail Terms, HAARETZ (June 23, 2010, 1:32 AM), http://
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/court-exempts-immanuel-mothers-from-jail-terms-1.297749. 
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A. Procedural Challenges to Relying on Cultural Expert Testimony 
There are four central challenges to reliance on the testimony of cultural 
experts, most of them involving the formulation of a model for introducing 
such testimony into legal proceedings.92F92 First, as with other experts, the relia-
bility of the cultural information brought by the expert might be questiona-
ble.93F93 For example, “facts” determined by anthropologists depend on the un-
derlying anthropological theory, which might be vigorously debated among 
experts in the field. 94 F94Naturally, jurists are not always conscious of controver-
sies in academic research. Moreover, cultural experts’ materials can be deliber-
ately distorted by those with partisan interests, and the court’s capability to 
discover such distortion is limited due to the nature of the information.95F95 In-
deed, “[w]e call expert witnesses to testify about matters that are beyond the 
ordinary understanding of lay people . . . and then we ask lay judges and jurors 
to judge their testimony.” 96F96 This may lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Second, the compatibility of cultural disciplines with the legal process is 
debatable.97F97 How can anthropologists, for example, effectively convey insights 
involving context, cultural change, or cultural ambiguity within a procedure 
that exalts binding decisions and discrete definitions and categories? This ten-
sion can complicate the task of the finder of fact. 
Third, there is a concern that a cultural expert’s involvement in legal pro-
ceedings may influence her research in a way that will skew the outcome of 
future proceedings. 98 F98 Can such involvement, for example, generate a change in 
the anthropological ethos of nonintervention, ending with the anthropologist 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Some of these problems are characteristic to most expert witnesses, whereas others are unique 
to cultural experts. 
 93 See Rosen, supra note 45, at 556–57. 
 94 In Yoder, expert Anthropologist Dr. John Hostetler claimed that coercing the Amish children to 
attend high school would cause them psychological harm, and would bring about the destruction of 
the Amish community. This conclusion was reached based on the organism theory, according to 
which a society or social structure is influenced by changes in one of its components, and may pose a 
danger to its continued existence. The organism theory is a controversial functional theory, yet the 
case was de facto decided based upon it. See Rosen, supra note 45, at 562–65; ROSEN, supra note 27, 
at 121–25. 
 95 David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know 
About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 
45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003); John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial 
Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 685 (1984); see Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The 
Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 
113, 115, 143, 152, 156 (1993). 
 96 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1182. 
 97 Rosen, supra note 45, at 566; see Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “Culture” in Court: Albani-
an Migrants and the Anthropologist as Expert Witness, in APPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY: PRO-
FESSIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 209, 217, 224 (Sarah Pink ed., 2006). 
 98 Rosen, supra note 45, at 567–69. 
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losing her uniqueness as an agent of reliable information? 99 F99 Or can anthropol-
ogists come to terms with representing a cultural interest that hurts weaker 
members of society? 100 F100 
Fourth, even more so than other experts, cultural experts are susceptible 
to self-identification with the group about which they testify. The point of an 
anthropologists’ study of a group of people “is to document their world, their 
way of seeing and doing reality . . . [which] will necessarily portray them in a 
sympathetic light . . . .”101F101 This may raise questions as to the credibility or po-
tential bias of the expert’s testimony. 
These challenges require the development of guidelines regarding the tes-
timony of cultural experts. Rules 702 to 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as interpreted by U.S. courts, discussed supra Part II, are a good model for 
such guidelines. They do not, however, deal separately with cultural experts, 
and are understandably lacking with respect to the specific challenges facing 
experts’ home disciplines. Lawrence Rosen and other scholars have presented 
further suggestions, including providing court-appointed cultural experts, in 
addition to the parties’ experts, that could narrow the issue for the court and 
define the basic theories and concepts that are relevant to the issue in the case. 
These scholars also have suggested requiring parties to send any expert opin-
ion to the other party in advance and to attach a bibliography of the works re-
lied upon by their expert. 
B. The Risk of Perpetuating Bias Through Judicial Reliance on  
Certain Testimony 
Although the importance of dealing with these challenges should not be 
minimized, the greatest challenge facing the use of cultural experts is the elim-
ination of cultural bias—the same problem that the use of cultural experts is 
itself intended to eliminate.102F102 Judges do not enter the courtroom as a blank 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Schwandner-Sievers, supra note 97, at 210. 
 100 Id. at 210, 211. An interpretation about a culture may become a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
empowers those who profit from such practices. 
 101 Michael H. Agar, Stranger in a Strange Land: Anthropologists in Agency Settings, 1 REV. 
POL’Y RES. 133, 139 (1981) (internal italics omitted). 
As we did our work and wrote our report, I know that we tried to be fair to all points of 
view. But I don’t think I would deny that there was a slight lean toward the Indians’ 
point of view. In a way this bias is inevitable. The point of an ethnographic view of 
some group is to document their world, their way of seeing and doing reality. This will 
necessarily portray them in a sympathetic light, or at least it should.  
Id. In Yoder, the possibility of bias as a result of explicitly taking culture into account was taken to the 
extreme, as Hostetler grew up in an Amish community, and referred to the community in his testimo-
ny as “our Amish culture.” See Rosen, supra note 45, at 564.  
 102 It is argued that in criminal cases judges are less willing to accept social science evidence 
when it goes against pre-existing truths that have a long history of acceptance in the legal system. 
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slate. Their subconscious, in Cardozo’s words, or common sense, in Mautner’s, 
controls their decision making to some extent.103 Adopting the practice of uti-
lizing cultural experts as a solution for courts’ cultural bias may still result in a 
biased judgment and one with potentially worse consequences than the alterna-
tive regime, since it is disguised as well-informed and objective. The question 
of what the real influence of cultural experts is on the legal process raises sev-
eral concerns. 
First, there is the concern that judges use cultural experts’ information to 
rationalize a decision based on their subconscious predilection. That is, cultural 
information can be molded by the judge to justify any conclusion, which is 
dependent mainly on the judge’s preexisting cultural agenda. It can be argued, 
for example, that in Brown v. Board of Education the majority of the United 
States Supreme Court was already leaning in favor of desegregation when it 
and the other desegregation cases came before the Court, so that the cultural 
information simply bolstered the decision the justices were predisposed to 
make, and was not as decisive as it seemed.104 If that is the case, cultural in-
                                                                                                                           
Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 
TEMP. L. REV. 55, 69–72 (1998). I argue a similar phenomenon exists in culture-related cases, where 
the judge’s pre-existing cultural agenda will determine whether she will accept the cultural expert’s 
testimony. 
 103 Many scholars have noted that justice is not blind. Felix Cohen was one of the bluntest among 
these scholars, stating that judges’ political, economic, and professional backgrounds and activities are 
the driving forces of their judicial decisions. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 846 (1935). Furthermore, according to behavioral 
psychology, the human mind is biased by nature, and regardless of interests, judicial decisions are 
incapable of objectivity. The biases that influence the legal process include, for example, hindsight 
bias and the egocentric biases. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 784 (2001). Following the school of judicial behaviorism, two versions of analysis of judges’ 
behavior have developed in American political science since the 1980s. The first is the attitudinal 
model, according to which judicial decisions are mostly based upon the particular judge’s attitude in 
regard to the other judges’ attitudes. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the 
Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 28 (1997). The second version is 
the strategic judicial behavior model, according to which judges’ attitudes are inseparable from the 
context of governance relations. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES 
MAKE 9 (1998). 
 104 Between the years 1938 and 1950, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases involving 
black plaintiffs who challenged their exclusion from state institutions of higher education. See, e.g., 
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (reaffirming unanimously Gaines v. Canada and 
holding that Oklahoma was required to provide the plaintiff with a legal education as soon as it does 
so for applicants of any other group); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351–52 (1938) 
(holding that Missouri’s practice of maintaining an all-white state law school, while agreeing to pay 
black residents’ tuition at institutions in neighboring states, violated the equal protection clause). 
There were also social, economic, and political changes in the United States at the time that help ex-
plain the development of the legal doctrine of desegregation. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD 
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); MICHAEL J. KLAR-
MAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004). 
252 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:229 
formation might be used to hide the judge’s preexisting cultural agenda and the 
bias inherent in the legal process. 
Second, while judges have a desire to prove that justice is blind, their in-
herent cultural biases cannot totally be eliminated. From an institutional point 
of view, judges have an interest in proving—both to society and to them-
selves—that justice is color blind, gender blind, wealth blind and culture blind. 
As has been proven countless times regarding race, gender, and economic sta-
tus, justice cannot be blind.105 As long as justice is determined by humans, it 
cannot be culture blind, since cultural bias is inherent in the natural human 
condition, and stems from it. Even setting aside culturally derived interests, as 
social beings we necessarily have our own social common sense, which affects 
not only our perceptions of different cultures but our ability to change those 
perceptions. We can try to mitigate our natural inclination, such as through the 
use of cultural experts, but we cannot eliminate it altogether. In this respect, we 
need to understand the challenge that cultural information itself poses to the 
(questionable) goal of cultural neutrality in the legal process. Cultural infor-
mation is different from other scientific information—it is inseparable from 
society and politics, and it derives from them.106 It seems counterintuitive, 
therefore, that information that is by definition not neutral can neutralize our 
natural social biases.  
Third, judges’ exercise of discretion with respect to expert testimony is 
also dictated by their common sense. This includes, for instance, whether to 
accept or reject the expert opinion; the interpretation of information that is pre-
sented to the court; and the decision of which cultures “require” an expert and 
which do not.107 All of these factors depend on the judge’s preconceptions and 
receptiveness to the cultural information. For example, in the case of Anna 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860 
(1977); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139, 140; Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1559–60 (1989). 
 106 See, e.g., ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952–55, at 172–73 (Leon Friedman, ed. 1969). In the 1952 oral 
argument for Gebhart v. Belton, Justice Frankfurter commented that the Court “[is] in a domain which 
I do not yet regard as science in the sense of mathematical certainty. This is all opinion evidence . . . . 
I do not mean that I disrespect it. I simply know its character . . . . We are dealing here with very sub-
tle things, very subtle testimony.” Id.; see Gebhart v. Belton, 344 U.S. 891 (1952). As Counselor John 
W. Davis stated during oral argument in Briggs v. Elliot, “[M]uch of that which is handed around 
under the name of social science is an effort on the part of the scientist to rationalize his own precon-
ceptions. They find usually, in my limited observation, what they go out to find.” ARGUMENT: THE 
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
1952–55, supra, at 59; see Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952). 
 107 As established by the case law presented above, American judges avail themselves more easily 
of cultural experts regarding African-American culture than with respect to Chinese culture, and Israe-
li judges avail themselves of cultural experts less reluctantly with respect to the Bedouin and Ethiopi-
an cultures than Jewish ultra-Orthodox culture. 
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Mae He, discussed supra, the judge found the testimony given by the Chinese 
cultural expert who testified on behalf of the Hes to be “totally lacking in cred-
ibility” and “unbelievable,” and instead based his impressions about Chinese 
families on Americans’ common perceptions about China.108 In Delgamuukw, 
the Chief Justice dismissed most of the experts’ testimony, stating, “apart from 
urging almost total acceptance of all Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en cultural values, 
the anthropologists add little to the important questions that must be decided in 
this case.”109 The Chief Justice reasoned that “[he was] able to make the re-
quired important findings about the history of these people, sufficient for this 
case, without this evidence.”110 
As the application of the practice of using cultural experts and their find-
ings are dependent on the specific judge’s preconceived cultural agenda, then 
in addition to a biased judgment, the legal process suffers from lack of certain-
ty, and we also face a challenge to the rule of law. This challenge to the rule of 
law is distinct from other inconsistencies in rulings among courts. As opposed 
to sporadic inconsistencies deriving from different interpretations of fact, law 
or even scientific expert opinions, the challenge cultural experts pose to the 
rule of law is intrinsic to the issue. A decision based upon the opinion of a cul-
tural expert or lack thereof is necessarily a value judgment. Ironically, the deci-
sion whether to rely upon the cultural expert, and in which cases, stems from 
the same circumstance that raise the need for a cultural expert in the first place, 
that is, the judge’s common sense, which is based upon her social group’s 
knowledge about the world. We thus enter a vicious circle: the judge’s com-
mon sense, combined with the cultural variety of the litigants appearing in 
front of her, demands at times a cultural interpreter, that is, the cultural expert. 
However, the same common sense also dictates the judge’s receptiveness to the 
cultural information, as well as the weight she will attach to it in the final 
judgment. 
This is not to say that cultural information and cultural experts have no 
weight or influence on judges and that judges’ cultural biases will always pre-
vail. On the contrary, the use of cultural experts is a beneficial practice that 
Israel should formally adopt in its legal regime. Judges, however, must always 
be aware of their inherent cultural bias—their subconscious or common sense 
ingrained by their native cultures. This cultural bias is a natural social condi-
tion, and should not be seen in a negative light as long as it remains out in the 
open and does not hide in the dark recesses of the courts. This natural social 
condition can and should be mitigated by the use of cultural experts in courts, 
but it is crucial to remember that cultural bias cannot be completely eliminated. 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 2005 WL 3132353 at *29; see also supra notes 55–65 and ac-
companying text. 
 109 Delgamuukw v. The Queen, [1991] 79 D.L.R. 185 (Can.), par. 375 (B.C. S.C.). 
 110 Id. 
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V. A PATH FORWARD: PROMOTING AWARENESS OF CULTURAL BIAS 
ALONGSIDE MORE ROBUST EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Beyond the expanded use of cultural expert testimony, the bar, both in its 
professional organizations and in its law schools, should make greater efforts 
to identify cultural bias and develop practices for mitigating its effects. Future 
judges and jurists should begin obtaining awareness of their own cultural bias-
es while they are in law school, and they should continue to reflect on their 
inherent biases throughout their professional careers. Awareness alone, howev-
er, is not sufficient, and must thus be coupled with a regulated practice of using 
cultural experts in courts. Taken together, increased reflection, preparation, and 
use of regulated expert testimony will mitigate courtroom cultural bias. Under 
such a regime, even if decisions are made on the basis of pre-existing cultural 
beliefs, appellate courts will have means to scrutinize these decisions based on 
the judge’s use of cultural expert testimony. 
Obtaining awareness of cultural bias should start in law school. Alongside 
constitutive conceptions about the law (inter alia legal positivism, legal real-
ism, critical legal studies, and feminist theory of the law), law schools should 
incorporate into their jurisprudential philosophy an approach concerning cul-
tural bias in the law. This concept, as the other leading jurisprudential con-
cepts, should not be restricted to courses on the theory of jurisprudence, but 
should permeate most law school courses. For this to happen, apart from mak-
ing this theory part of the basic curriculum of law schools, the corpus of legal 
literature on the subject of cultural bias needs to expand, and become a sepa-
rate doctrine that stands on its own.111  
Following this institutional and academic change, in order to sustain 
awareness of judges’ and jurists’ cultural bias, professional training programs 
for lawyers and judges on the subject should be developed and taught year 
round. Two examples of such programs are found in the University of Nevada, 
Reno that offers Judicial Studies Degree Programs,112 and the Haifa University 
in Israel that offers the International Academy for Judges Program.113 
Research in the field of law and psychology is divided as to the signifi-
cance that an individual’s awareness of her own bias has in reducing or dimin-
ishing it.114 But even if we accept the conclusions of the research arguing that 
                                                                                                                           
 111 We can refer, for example, to gender bias as cultural bias, but it is important to separate the 
two, in order to be able to address the distinct nature of each type of bias. 
 112 Judicial Studies Degree Programs, University of Nevada, Reno, http://www.judicialstudies.
unr.edu/benefits.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015); 2015 Judicial Studies Degree Program Description, 
http://www.judicialstudies.unr.edu/JS%20Prog%20Desc%202015_FINAL.pdf. 
 113 The International Academy for Judges, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law, http://weblaw.
haifa.ac.il/en/JudgesAcademy/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 114 Several studies have shown that people are able to compensate for the effects of implicit bias 
when they are aware of its existence. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debi-
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awareness of bias does not reduce it, the practice of using cultural experts can 
reinforce a judicial decision’s building blocks. Awareness of the bias, accom-
panied by a formal and regulated practice of using cultural experts in courts 
will succeed in broadening the judges’ perspectives. A judge might still choose 
not to accept the expert testimony, or interpret it according to her preconceived 
cultural beliefs, but the cultural information related by the expert will be re-
vealed, and the judge’s decision will be examined based upon her use of this 
information. The aftermath of Delgamuukw and He serve as an excellent illus-
tration of this point. Both judgments were severely criticized—directly and 
indirectly—for the role cultural bias played in the outcome of the decisions, 
and both cases were later reversed.115 By increasing awareness and, important-
ly, putting in place rules relating to and increasing the use of cultural expert 
testimony, bias will be more readily reviewable, and may actually begin to re-
duce its effect on judicial decision making. 
CONCLUSION 
Judges, like every other person, hold views and beliefs about the world, 
society, and other persons and cultures, which stem from their own cultural 
perspectives. These views and beliefs are manifested in the judge’s subcon-
scious or common sense, and have an impact on her judicial decisions. This 
impact is especially significant in culture-related cases. 
The practice of relying on the opinions or testimony of cultural experts is 
meant to mitigate the influence of the judge’s cultural bias on her decisions, as 
well as to bridge the cultural gap between the judge and the litigant. This prac-
tice is prevalent in the United States, but generally absent from Israel’s legal 
system. 
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Although the practice of using cultural experts in courts is extremely im-
portant, and should be applied in Israel, it is dangerous to believe that it solves 
or neutralizes the problem of judges’ cultural biases, since its application is 
itself culture-dependent and might be used as means to rationalize and disguise 
biased decisions. Cultural bias is intrinsic to human nature, and it cannot be 
completely eradicated. Therefore, judges must be aware of this bias even when 
relying on cultural experts and try as best as possible to minimize its effects on 
their decision making. Obtaining this awareness should start in law school and 
be reinforced through professional training programs for jurists and judges.  
